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INTRODUCTION 
The securities laws have acquired a bad name.  Once viewed as 
something akin to “the Savior of All Humanity,”1 they have fallen into 
disrepute. 
Partly in response to perceived flaws in private securities litigation as 
a tool for detecting and deterring fraud in financial markets by 
supplementing the government’s limited enforcement resources, 
scholars—myself included—have argued in favor of alternative 
approaches.2  Congress has on two occasions found cause to explore 
these “third ways”3 to combat securities fraud.  In the Sarbanes-Oxley 
 
* UP IN THE AIR (Paramount Pictures 2009). 
** Harold A. Anderson Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law. 
1. E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private Law: The 
Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571, 1580 (2004). 
2. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-
Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91 (2007) [hereinafter 
Rapp, Beyond Protection] (arguing that Congress should adopt a bounty model for securities 
fraud whistleblowers); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, False Claims, not Securities Fraud: Towards 
Corporate Governance by Whistleblowers, 15 NEXUS J. L. & POL’Y 55 (2010) [hereinafter Rapp, 
False Claims, not Securities Fraud] (suggesting the use of the False Claims Act to facilitate 
payouts to whistleblowers for companies that had received federal bailout funds). 
3. A “third-way” legal or policy solution draws on the insights of two dominant approaches 
and seeks to harness the “strengths of each in order to avoid the perils of the other.”  Shelley 
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Act of 2002 (“SOX”),4 Congress extended anti-retaliation protection to 
employees who engaged in the “protected activity” of blowing the 
whistle on violations of the securities laws.5  Because SOX provided 
protection but no “carrot,” I argued in several previous articles that 
policymakers should develop a “bounty” scheme for securities tipsters.6  
Congress embraced that notion, to a degree, in the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”).7 
While the whistleblower protection provision of SOX and the bounty 
provision of Dodd-Frank attracted considerable media attention,8 they 
have only recently begun to produce a body of case law interpreting the 
scope of each statute’s coverage.  Courts have begun to deal with the 
same kind of thorny issues of statutory interpretation in regard to 
SOX—and may soon confront similar issues with Dodd-Frank9—that 
they have confronted in interpreting the securities laws in their eight-
decade history. 
In this Essay, I attempt to uncover whether the whistleblower 
provisions of SOX and Dodd-Frank should be viewed as “securities 
laws” subject to the sort of restrictive judicial interpretation that has 
been so prominent in recent decades.  The Supreme Court, this fall, 
confronted a difficult case of statutory interpretation involving SOX, 
and should it choose to follow the policy-infused approach to 
construction it has used in recent private securities cases, we should not 
be surprised to see a decision that sharply undercuts the scope and 
coverage of SOX’s protections.  Should the same sort of interpretation 
arise in future Dodd-Frank cases, the holes I have identified in that 
 
Cavalieri, Between Victim and Agent: A Third-Way Feminist Account of Trafficking for Sex Work, 
86 IND. L.J. 1409, 1445 (2011). 
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
5. Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note 2, at 95. 
6. See id. at 10 (discussing Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) bounties versus 
other bounty systems). 
7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
8. Rapp, False Claims, not Securities Fraud, supra note 2, at 104. 
9. Because the bounty scheme in Dodd-Frank is largely an administrative one, however, it 
may be that the SEC, rather than the courts, will have to face questions of interpretation.  Still, 
courts have begun to confront some difficult questions of statutory interpretation relating to the 
non-bounty components of Dodd-Frank.  For instance, Dodd-Frank’s reinforcing anti-retaliation 
provisions for securities fraud whistleblowers are ambiguous as to whether an employee is 
protected if she protests securities violations internally, or only if she reports them to the SEC.  
See Jenna Green, SEC Argues Whistleblowers Can Report Internally, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 20, 
2014, http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/id=1392911370189?slreturn=2014012510 
2254#. 
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statute10 may widen even further. 
Part I of this Essay describes the Supreme Court’s policy-based 
concerns about securities litigation, which have prompted a steady 
constriction of the reach of doctrine in this area.  Part II discusses 
Lawson v. FMR LLC, an example of a difficult question of statutory 
interpretation that has arisen in connection with the new whistleblower 
statutes.  Part III seeks to resolve whether the bases for the judicial 
suspicion of securities litigation will apply with equal force when the 
Court confronts questions of interpretation in Lawson and future 
whistleblower cases. 
I. THE JUDICIAL CASE AGAINST THE SECURITIES LAWS 
For nearly four decades after their enactment in the wake of the stock 
market crash of 1929 and the resulting economic crisis, the United 
States Supreme Court interpreted federal securities laws broadly.11  
Rule 10b-5,12 the core anti-fraud provision drafted by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”), was to be interpreted to serve the 
“broad remedial purposes” of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.13 
The tide turned in the mid-1970s, when the Court’s securities 
opinions took a decidedly restrictive tone.14  In 1975, the Court 
characterized the body of federal securities laws as a “judicial oak” 
spawned from a mere “legislative acorn” and warned broadly that 
securities litigation was “vexatious.”15  In the years that have followed, 
the Court’s policy view on securities litigation has, at times, seemed to 
grow even more disdainful.  The Court recently compared civil 
securities litigation to the crime of extortion, describing potential 
defendants as “innocent” rather than simply not liable.16 
Policy concerns have shaped securities jurisprudence in ways perhaps 
more pronounced than in other major areas of federal litigation for two 
reasons.   
First, many securities cases “involve complicated and specialized 
 
10. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street 
by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 90–95 
(2012) [hereinafter Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties]. 
11. Sullivan & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1580. 
12. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2013). 
13. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). 
14. Sullivan & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1582. 
15. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739–40 (1975). 
16. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 162 (2008). 
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questions of statutory construction.”17  With the statutory text and 
legislative history limited in usefulness, the Court has (and federal 
courts following its lead have) been guided by policy in restricting the 
scope of the securities laws in a number of ways.   
Second, where previous expansion in the coverage of the securities 
laws, such as the Court’s embrace of a private right of action in Borak,18 
was motivated by policy goals, countervailing policy concerns could be 
used to justify restricting the laws in later interpretations.19  The Court’s 
characterization of securities litigation as “vexatious” “has been 
extraordinarily influential in the development of securities fraud 
jurisprudence.”20  Three decades of “judicial constriction” have been 
the result.21 
Of particular concern to courts—and Congress—are class action 
lawsuits, widely viewed as potentially “abusive.”22  Class action 
securities lawsuits are theoretically problematic, since they suffer from 
an inherent “circularity” problem.23  Damages are paid by a corporation 
but ultimately born by its current shareholders.  Damages are paid to the 
corporation’s former shareholders, or some subsection of its 
shareholders.  Diversified investors are equally likely to pay in a class 
action lawsuit as they are to receive a payment; thus, a priori a rational 
investor should be hostile to class action lawsuits in that plaintiffs’ 
attorneys will reap a sizable share of any settlement or judgment yet a 
shareholder can equally expect to lose and to win.24  As a component of 
an investor protection regime, then, the class action lawsuit seems 
misplaced.  Even though it may be that class actions have been the most 
objectionable branch in the “judicial oak”25 of securities laws, the Court 
has handed down restrictive rulings even in cases that were not class 
actions,26 perhaps concerned that an expansionist view of securities 
 
17. Sullivan & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1600. 
18. Borak, 377 U.S. at 431. 
19. Wendy Gerwick Couture, The End of the Vexatiousness Rationale, 41 SEC. REG. L.J. 301 
(2013). 
20. Id. 
21. Marc I. Steinberg & Brent A. Kirby, The Assault on Section 11 of the Securities Act: A 
Study in Judicial Activism, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 55 (2010). 
22. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (noting the “abusive practices” in 
private securities litigation). 
23. Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. 
REV. 1103, 1128 (2008). 
24. Rapp, False Claims, not Securities Fraud, supra note 2, at 104. 
25. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739–40 (1975). 
26. For instance, the Court adopted a restrictive view of the meaning of the term “prospectus” 
in Gustafson v. Alloyd, 513 U.S. 561 (1995).  This case essentially involved a single plaintiff, 
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laws even in non-aggregate litigation could be used in future class 
action cases. 
Because liability in a class action lawsuit can involve a maddeningly 
high level of damages, moreover, there is a strong incentive to settle any 
securities lawsuit that survives motions on the pleadings.  There is too 
much risk for most defendants to “bet the company” so these cases are 
rarely tried, and discovery itself can be so expensive27 that even 
proceeding to summary judgment appears to be a bad bet for most 
defendants.  Therefore, private litigants will almost never try a 
securities case, and much of the legislative counter-revolution against 
securities law has involved targeting the way in which motions on the 
pleadings are considered. 
Securities lawsuits are rarely the subject of full-blown trials.  Instead, 
defendants either win a motion to dismiss, or the case will settle.  
Because of this, facts matter less than law in resolving securities 
disputes and the importance of legal interpretations (particularly those 
offered by appellate courts and the Supreme Court) is magnified.  As 
the Court has grown more and more suspicious of the underlying legal 
framework regulating private securities litigation, it has repeatedly 
adopted restrictive readings of the laws’ scope based on its policy 
preferences. 
While scholars, such as one of this symposium’s presenters, 
Professor Couture,28 have criticized the use of “policy heuristics” to 
resolve securities laws disputes in the Court,29 these calls have to date, 
in a wide variety of cases, fallen on deaf ears.30  Consider, for example, 
because it will lead into the discussion I embark upon in the next 
section, the 2011 decision in Janus Capital Group, Inc., et al. v. First 
Derivative Traders.31 
Plaintiff First Derivative, representing an investor class, sued Janus 
Capital Management, LLC (“JCM”), a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Janus Capital Group, Inc. (“JCG”), a major mutual fund provider.  The 
mutual funds were organized as a Massachusetts business trust, the 
 
Wind Point Partners, L.P.  The Court’s conclusion in that case was driven largely by a view that a 
broad interpretation of section 12(2) would be “bad policy.”  Elliott J. Weiss, Securities Act 
Section 12(2) After Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: What Questions Remain?, 50 BUS. LAW. 1209, 1214 
(1995). 
27. Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note 2, at 104. 
28. See Wendy Gerwick Couture, Around the World of Securities Fraud in Eighty Motions to 
Dismiss, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 553 (2014). 
29. Couture, supra note 19, at 5. 
30. But see id. at 13–14. 
31. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
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Janus Investment Fund (“JIF”).  JCG created a separate, wholly-owned 
subsidiary entity, JCM, which became the administrator of mutual funds 
under the JIF umbrella.32  The plaintiffs asserted fraud in connection 
with JIF’s statements about the suitability of certain funds for market 
timing.33  The prospectus in question was written by JCM employees 
but submitted to investors by JIF.34  The claim was advanced under the 
familiar anti-fraud provisions, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.35 
Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for any person “[t]o make any untrue 
statement” of material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities.36  To be liable, said the Court, JCM must have “‘made’ the 
material misstatements in the prospectus.”37  The Court concluded that 
JCM could not be held liable.  One “‘makes’ a statement by stating 
it.”38  Turning to rules of grammar to construe the rule, the Court opined 
that “to make a statement” is the equivalent of “to state,” just as “to 
make a proclamation” is the equivalent of “to proclaim” or “to make a 
promise” is the equivalent of “to promise.”39 
With a carriage return and an indent, the Court hurdled from 
grammar and dictionaries to the following conclusion: “[T]he maker of 
a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the 
statement, including its content and how to communicate it. . . . One 
who prepares or publishes a statement on behalf of another is not its 
maker.”40  A speechwriter does not “make” a speech—the credit or 
blame goes to the person who delivers the speech.41  Only the party 
listed as the “Filer” of a prospectus—in this case, JIF—is the “maker” 
of the statement and subject to potential liability.42  JIF and JCM are 
“legally separate entities,” which “observed” proper “corporate 
formalities” and maintained boards more independent than required by 
 
32. Id. at 2300. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 2312. 
35. Id. at 2301. 
36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2013). 
37. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2301. 
38. Id. at 2302. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id.  This analogy is an odd one.  While a speech-deliverer has “ultimate control” over what 
comes out of her mouth, a speechwriter may still have “control” over things the speech deliverer 
doesn’t care to overrule.  Couldn’t a speechwriter slip something in that a speechmaker might not 
notice?  And doesn’t a speechwriter get some credit if her identity is revealed?  See generally 
ROBERT SCHLESINGER, WHITE HOUSE GHOSTS: PRESIDENTS AND THEIR SPEECHWRITERS (2008) 
(describing the “crucial” role played by Presidential speechwriters). 
42. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2305. 
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law.43 
The Court’s interpretation is certainly a plausible reading of Rule 
10b-5, but as Justice Breyer pointed out in dissent, it is not compelled—
the “English language does not impose upon the word ‘make’ 
boundaries of the kind the majority finds determinative.”44  Clearly, 
policy concerns favoring interpreting the securities laws along “narrow 
dimensions” played a role.45 
The Court’s reasoning is bad news for my four-old daughter.  One of 
her favorite activities is baking cookies and brownies (and following up 
by eating them).  Under the Court’s interpretation, however, she really 
did not “bake” brownies if I am the one with ultimate control (for 
prudential reasons) of how long they stay in the oven or at what 
temperature they are to be cooked.  Now, I have to prohibit her from 
claiming, when handing out treats, that she “baked” the cookies.46 
II. INTERPRETING SOX AND DODD-FRANK 
This term, the Court considered a case giving it the opportunity to 
interpret the text of SOX’s whistleblower protection.  In Lawson v. 
FMR, LLC,47 the Court granted certiorari to review a decision by the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals that had read narrowly the scope of SOX 
protection to dismiss a case filed by the employees of a contractor of a 
publicly held company.48 
Section 806 of SOX creates an anti-retaliation provision to protect 
whistleblowers who raise concerns about financial fraud.  As codified, 
that provision provides: 
(a) Whistleblower protection for employees of publicly traded 
companies—No company with a class of securities registered under 
section 12 [of the ‘34 Act], or that is required to file reports under 
section 15(d) [of the ‘34 Act] . . . or any officer, employee, contractor, 
 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
45. Id. at 2302 (majority opinion) (citing Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 
552 U.S. 148, 167 (2008)).  For a further discussion of Janus, see Anthony Sallah, Scheme 
Liability: Conduct Beyond the Misrepresentations, Deceptive Acts, and Possible Janus 
Intervention, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 181, 193–95 (2013). 
46. This would not be the case, of course, if she were to “bake” the goodies in an “Easy Bake 
Oven” designed for use by children.  Being a products liability teacher as well, however, I am too 
familiar with the cases dealing with such a device to allow it into my own home.  See King v. 
Hasbro, Inc., No. 07-4001, 2009 WL 3157319 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2009) (plaintiff suffered 
injuries from “Easy Bake Oven”); Overen v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 07-1430, 2007 WL 2695792 (D. 
Minn. Sept. 27, 2007) (same). 
47. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2387 (2013). 
48. See id. at 68. 
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subcontractor, or agent of such company . . . may [retaliate] against an 
employee . . . [for protected whistleblowing activity].49 
In Lawson, the plaintiffs were employed by private companies 
created by Fidelity, a family of mutual funds, to provide the 
administrative services to Fidelity funds.  Employed by privately held 
entities, the whistleblowers protested fraud on the part of FMR, LLC, 
which operated to the disadvantage of shareholders of Fidelity funds 
(which were public companies).  The Funds themselves, while public, 
had essentially no employees of their own.  The Court confronted the 
question of the scope of SOX’s protection.  Does it create a civil cause 
of action for employees of contractors of public companies, or only for 
employees of public companies? 
The statutory text is amenable to two plausible interpretations.  The 
plaintiffs, supported by the United States, pointed to the phrase “an 
employee” and argued that it includes “an employee” of a “contractor” 
of a public company.  To read the coverage narrowly, argued the United 
States, would effectively exempt mutual funds from SOX’s protection 
since the covered public companies in the mutual fund industry have no 
employees of their own who would be entitled to bring SOX anti-
retaliation claims.50 
The defendants pointed to the caption of the statute—seemingly 
limiting its reach to employees of public companies.51  The Court was 
thus given the opportunity to clarify the usefulness of statutory captions 
in its opinion.  Captions might confirm the meaning of terms contained 
in the text,52 or, alternatively, provide only “short-hand references” that 
could not be used to limit a broadly delineated statutory right.53 
To the defendants, the statutory provision included the phrase 
“contractor[s] . . . or agent[s]” to guard against the possibility that a 
public company would retaliate against one of its employees by 
retaining a third-party contractor to actually conduct the retaliation.54  
Defendants—and the First Circuit, in siding with them—explained the 
inclusion of the “contractor” language as an attempt to guard against the 
“ax-wielding specialist.”55  The First Circuit “not[ed]” the Seventh 
 
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012). 
50. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7–8, Lawson v. FMR 
LLC, No. 12-3 (U.S. Aug. 7, 2013), 2013 WL 4049264, at *7. 
51. Lawson, 670 F.3d at 68. 
52. INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 189 (1991). 
53. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & O.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528 (1947). 
54. Lawson, 670 F.3d at 67. 
55. Id. at 69 n.11 (citing Fleszar v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 598 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 2010)). 
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Circuit’s reference to “the character George Clooney played in ‘Up in 
the Air.’”56  In its brief to the Supreme Court, the 
defendants/respondents took up this analogy.57  The “ax-wielding” 
specialist “scenario was depicted in the 2009 movie ‘Up in the Air,’ in 
which George Clooney’s character works for a private company ‘whose 
contracts are in corporate downsizing.  In other words, they fire 
people.’”58  Clooney’s character in the film, derived from Walter Kirn’s 
novel of the same name,59 is an obsessive-compulsive corporate 
consultant with a yen to achieve super-elite status in frequent flyer 
programs.60  Congress, supposed the defendants, meant only to prevent 
covered public companies from retaining such outside support to 
conduct retaliation, not to extend the coverage of SOX protection to 
employees of privately held firms.61 
Up in the Air does not present precisely the scenario for which the 
respondents invoke it, in that Clooney’s character is not retained to 
retaliate against a whistleblower.  However, his firm is clearly valued by 
its clients for mitigating litigation risks associated with terminating 
client employees.  In one passage, Clooney’s character is retained by the 
manufacturer of a secret-formula sports-energy drink to fire three senior 
sales and marketing executives.62  The character’s job was to 
“neutralize the threat from the insiders who might well retaliate, and 
possibly scuttle the whole enterprise.”63  As he delivered the bad news 
to the executives, corporate guards were searching their desks for 
documents “that might play into the hands of legal foes” suing the 
company over the negative effects of its sports drinks on consumers.64 
Although the Court’s task in Lawson was a “seemingly simple 
exercise in statutory interpretation,”65 the ambiguity in the statute, and 
 
56. Id. 
57. Brief of Respondents, Lawson v. FMR LLC, No. 12-3 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2013), 2013 WL 
5441390, at *24–25; see also Reply Brief of Petitioner, Lawson, No. 12-3 (U.S. Oct. 30, 2013), 
2013 WL 5863751, at *6. 
58. Brief of Respondents, supra note 57, at *25 (quoting Up in the Air, Plot Summary, IMBD, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1193138/plotsummary (last visited Feb. 14, 2014)). 
59. WALTER KIRN, UP IN THE AIR (2001). 
60. UP IN THE AIR (Paramount Pictures 2009). 
61. Lawson, 670 F.3d at 67. 
62. KIRN, supra note 59, at 247–48. 
63. Id. at 248. 
64. Id. 
65. Geoffrey Rapp, Argument Preview: Eligibility of employees of public company 
contractors for Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 30, 2013, 11:00 
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/10/argument-preview-eligibility-of-employees-of-public-
company-contractors-for-sarbanes-oxley-whistleblower-protection/ [hereinafter Rapp, Argument 
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the lack of any legislative guidance, left open the question of how to 
resolve the statute’s scope.  Were the Court to apply the anti-
vexatiousness policy heuristic familiar to securities lawyers, one would 
have expected the Court to be restrictive in its reading. 
The Court released its decision—a divided one—on March 4, 2014.  
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg reversed the First Circuit and 
held that SOX protection extended to the employees of contractors of 
public companies when those employees were retaliated against because 
they engaged in protected activity.66 
Two preliminary comments about the Court’s decision in Lawson 
that bear on the question posed in this Essay. 
First, the majority decision cited very little in the way of securities 
law precedent; instead, it spent much of its time discussing employee 
whistleblower protections in other statutory schemes (such as a statute 
which provides whistleblower protection in airline safety cases).  The 
majority cites tax cases,67 a number of whistleblower cases in other 
areas,68 and a number of provisions of securities statutes and secondary 
sources on securities law, but it doesn’t cite a single case that would 
ordinarily be offered as an example of a “securities law” decision. 
By contrast, the dissent (authored by Justice Sotomayor) prominently 
cites the classic “vexatiousness” case from the securities law pantheon, 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.69 
Second, a disagreement arose between the majority and the dissent on 
whether the Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board 
(“ARB”) was entitled to administrative deference.70  The dissent argued 
that if any administrative agency was to be entitled to deference in SOX 
interpretations, it should be the SEC (which had not issued an opinion 
on the coverage of the anti-retaliation provision).71  The  majority, while 
avoiding ruling on the issue because it decided that the text of the 
statute provided a sufficient basis for reversal, appeared inclined to 
afford deference to the Department of Labor, the agency to which 
 
Preview]. 
66. Lawson v. FMR LLC, No. 12-3, slip. op. at 1 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2014). 
67. Id. at 24 n.16. 
68. Id. at 28 n.20. 
69. Id. at 8 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  Justice Sotomayor cites Blue Chips for the proposition 
that a Congressional choice to depart from an available, easy-to-follow model should not be 
“presume[d] . . . to be accidental.”  The specific line in Blue Chips cited by Justice Sotomayor is: 
“When Congress wished to provide a remedy to those who neither purchase nor sell securities, it 
had little trouble in doing so expressly.”  421 U.S. 723, 734 (1975). 
70. Lawson, No. 12-3, slip op. at 8 n.6 (majority opinion). 
71. Id. at 17–18 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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“Congress delegated [the] responsibility [for interpreting SOX 
whistleblower protections].”72  
III. WHAT ARE THE CORE FEATURES OF SECURITIES LAWS? 
The basic concept of American securities laws involves a search for 
mechanisms to ensure investors are protected from fraud: “In short, 
Congress wanted to prevent fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in 
securities transactions.”73  In this sense, it seems that both SOX and 
Dodd-Frank could be viewed as “securities laws,” although Dodd-Frank 
more clearly so. 
SOX sought to take advantage of the fact that employees had 
valuable information about ongoing securities fraud, yet might stay 
silent because blowing the whistle involved too great a risk of 
termination.74  But at the same time, SOX is more about protecting 
employees than it is about protecting investors—even if an employee 
inaccurately perceives fraud, she may be protected,75 and there has been 
little indication that any SOX complaints lead to governmental 
intervention.76  SOX’s title for section 1514A is “Civil action to protect 
against retaliation in fraud cases.”  SOX is about protecting against 
retaliation, more than about the fraud itself.  Dodd-Frank, more directly, 
is about investor protection: the law sought to “put more cops on the 
beat” to assist the SEC in its investor protection mission.77 
The fact that both statutes serve, in varying degrees of directness, 
investor-protection goals, however, would not make them subject to the 
suspicious interpretation the Court has employed in securities cases.  It 
is not the goal of investor protection that makes securities cases 
problematic, in the Court’s mind, but instead the way in which such 
cases are litigated and the exposure to which even “innocent” 
 
72. Id. at 8 n.6 (majority opinion). 
73. Eric C. Chaffee, Standing Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The Continued Validity of 
the Forced Seller Exception to the Purchaser-Seller Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 843, 886 
(2009). 
74. Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note 2, at 109. 
75. Marc I. Steinberg & Seth A. Kaufman, Minimizing Corporate Liability Exposure When 
the Whistle Blows in the Post Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 30 J. CORP. L. 445, 452 (2005). 
76. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Four Signal Moments in Whistleblower Law: 1983–2013, 30 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 389, 395–96 (2013). 
77. Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties, supra note 10, at 89 (quoting Industry Perspectives on the 
Obama Administration’s Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 62 (2009) (statement of William J. Brodsky, Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer, Chicago Board of Options Exchange), available at http://democrats.finan 
cialservices.house.gov/Hearings/hearingDetails.aspx?NewsID=1150). 
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defendants may be subjected.  Therefore, to determine if the Court will 
find SOX and Dodd-Frank claims “vexatious,” one has to plumb why 
securities laws have fallen into disrepute.  The Court has worried that 
widely expanded plaintiff classes lead to heightened potential 
damages,78 that defendants may be required to expend “large sums” in 
settlement negotiations and pretrial legal proceedings,79 about the 
possibility that new classes of defendants could be targeted in spite of 
innocence,80 and over the large number of groundless claims81 in the 
securities docket. 
Professor Couture identifies four aspects of private securities 
litigation that raise special policy concerns: 
(1) a plaintiff asserting an unmeritorious claim can nonetheless avoid 
dismissal and summary judgment and thereby extract settlement 
value; (2) a plaintiff asserting an unmeritorious claim can extract 
settlement value by performing extensive discovery that disrupts the 
business; (3) a plaintiff can establish crucial elements of the claim 
with uncorroborated, oral testimony; and (4) the court’s power to 
award attorneys’ fees [to defendants targeted by] vexatious litigation 
is “sharply circumscribed.”82 
Are these concerns present with regard to SOX and Dodd-Frank?  Let 
us begin with SOX.  The fear of unmeritorious claims by “shirking 
employees” seeking to “fend off scrutiny of their performance” has been 
lodged against the SOX provision.83  SOX claims may be even less 
amenable to dismissal on the pleadings than private securities class 
actions.  Securities class actions are subject to easier dismissal under the 
heightened pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995.84  Moreover, SOX claims may hinge on “factual” 
issues that make them poor candidates for dismissal on the pleadings.85  
The Department of Labor’s ARB “highly disfavor[s]” Rule 12 motions 
as “impractical” within the confines of its practices.86  Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration investigators, charged with initial 
 
78. Couture, supra note 19, at 2. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 3. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 7. 
83. Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley After Three Years, 2005 N.Z. L. REV. 365, 371 (2005). 
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2012). 
85. See Sylvester v. Parexel Int’l LLC, No. 07-123, 2011 WL 2517148 (Dep’t of Labor May 
25, 2011) (holding that heightened pleading standards for SOX claims are inappropriate because 
such claims “involve inherently factual issues”). 
86. Id. 
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evaluation of SOX complaints, are permitted to consider facts outside of 
the pleadings during preliminary phases of a SOX investigation.87  On 
the other hand, strict interpretations of various SOX provisions such as 
the statute of limitations have led to quite high dismissal rates.88 
The scope of discovery in SOX cases has been “broadly construed,” 
with the usual methods available during the administrative proceedings 
of a complaint.89  Protective orders are hard to obtain because the 
movant “must demonstrate good cause with specificity” to be entitled to 
such protection.90  Still, the costs of discovery in defending 
whistleblower cases may not be unreasonably high.  Whistleblower 
cases are not class actions, in which “company-wide policies or 
practices” might be relevant and therefore discoverable, dramatically 
raising the costs of discovery for defendants.91  Discovery costs in a 
whistleblower claim based on SOX are probably closer to the level in a 
typical employment discrimination case—which defense attorneys do 
not uniformly view to be excessive.92 
Can a SOX claim be proven with uncorroborated oral testimony?  A 
whistleblower must establish that she engaged in protected activity in 
order to be covered.  There may indeed be circumstances in which a 
whistleblower can only prove she made a report by testifying (orally) 
that she did so where a supervisor has denied that such a report was 
made.93  Quite a few whistleblowers, however, will copy corporate 
documents before leaving a company and offer those up as evidence in 
a subsequent proceeding.94 
 
87. Stephen B. Stern, Strategies for Analyzing and Responding to Sarbanes-Oxley 
Whistleblower Claims, in COMPLYING WITH SARBANES-OXLEY’S WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS 
7,  13 (Eddie Fournier ed., 2009). 
88. Richard Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley 
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 107 (2007). 
89. Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Current Developments in Employment Law: The Obama Years at 
Mid-Term, 2002 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMP. L. 1505. 
90. Id. 
91. Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 
DUKE L.J. 1251, 1300 (2002). 
92. See THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IN THEIR WORDS: 
ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION 8 (Mar. 
2010), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv3.pdf/$file/costciv3.pdf  
(respondents to one survey “reported varying experiences in employment discrimination 
litigation, some finding it costly and others not”). 
93. Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237, 298 (2009) (when this 
happens, “the fact-finder will need to choose between one party’s self-serving testimony and the 
other party’s self-serving testimony”). 
94. James Fisher et al., Privatizing Regulation: Whistleblowing and Bounty Hunting in the 
Financial Services Industry, 19 DICK. J. INT’L L. 117, 134 (2000). 
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To be sure, companies targeted in a SOX complaint will rarely 
receive an award to cover their fees or costs.  While some state 
whistleblower statutes have included provisions to allow for the 
imposition of fees for spurious complaints95 and the False Claims Act 
contains a narrow provision to that effect,96 SOX did not select that 
model. 
Under Dodd-Frank, neither of the first two concerns would apply 
because the plaintiff has no control over an SEC investigation launched 
as a result of her tips.  There is no “dismissal” of a whistleblower claim 
other than when the Commission declines to proceed further in an 
investigation or civil action.  The whistleblower has no ability to extract 
a settlement from the target firm directly.  While a whistleblower might 
report a tip to the SEC armed with little more than the whistleblower’s 
own words, one doubts that, in the absence of additional support, the 
SEC would take further action. 
In Dodd-Frank, the SEC has no power to award fees or costs to the 
target of a spurious whistleblower bounty submission.97  The SEC was 
confident that its rules impose standards sufficient to weed out 
“frivolous submissions.”98  To date, Dodd-Frank has resisted calls for a 
broad cost and fee-shifting measure to benefit wrongfully targeted 
defendants.99 
On balance, the concerns about “vexatiousness” that have driven 
courts to adopt highly formalistic and strict readings of the securities 
laws do not appear particularly pronounced in the realm of SOX and 
Dodd-Frank whistleblowers.  Yet the superficial connection to 
“securities” may lead courts to a more skeptical posture than law and 
policy would require. 
 
95. Valerie P. Kirk & Ann Clarke Snell, The Texas Whistleblower Act: Time for a Change, 26 
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 75, 103 (1995); Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate 
Whistleblowing Moral in the New Era of Dodd-Frank Act “Bounty Hunting,” 45 CONN. L. REV. 
483, 492 (2012). 
96. Andrew M. Hyer, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Unnecessarily Broad Impact of 
Qui Tam Civil False Claims Act Cases on Rural Health Care Providers, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 
459, 468–69 (2013). 
97. See generally Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-64545, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,303 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 
249) (discussing the rationales for declining to include an enforcement provision that would allow 
the SEC to assess fees and/or costs for non-meritorious or frivolous complaints). 
98. Id. at 34,303. 
99. Patrick A. Barthle II, Note, Whistling Rogues: A Comparative Analysis of the Dodd-Frank 
Whistleblower Bounty Program, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1201, 1236–40 (2012). 
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CONCLUSION 
Lawson exposed a “central tension in interpreting SOX,” namely 
“whether the statute should be read broadly, in that it is remedial and 
ambitious, or narrowly, as has increasingly been the case in Supreme 
Court decisions in securities fraud cases.”100  There is little reason to 
equate SOX or Dodd-Frank with the policy concerns that have 
prompted the Court, over the years, to be “vex[ed]” by securities 
litigation.  At the same time, the superficial connection between the 
conduct targeted by a Dodd-Frank or SOX whistleblower and a private 
securities class action may lead the Court to be formalistic and strict in 
its construction of the two whistleblower provisions. 
 
 
100. Rapp, Argument Preview, supra note 65. 
